Why the Next Bioterrorists May Not Make the Same Mistakes as Aum Shinrikyo
In conversations with law enforcement and security professionals, one view has repeatedly emerged: Aum Shinrikyo’s failed biological weapons program in the early 1990s shows that the risk of bioterrorism is overstated, despite warnings about AI-assisted bioterrorism and calls for enhanced preparedness from experts, philanthropists, and CEOs of AI companies. The Japanese doomsday cult responsible for the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack had money, facilities, scientifically educated members, and a leadership willing to cause mass harm. If any terrorist organization was well positioned to develop a large-scale biological weapon, Aum Shinrikyo was it. Yet its bioweapon program repeatedly failed. If Aum couldn’t The post Why the Next Bioterrorists May Not Make the Same Mistakes as Aum Shinrikyo appeared first on War on the Rocks.
